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上饒翻譯公司關鍵字：implement its enactment, the most common way in China is in a smaller range of the first pilot, which the Government and the public to the new system after the game, and then only in a larger context to promote the implementation . This link is considered to be the new system to obtain the necessary steps to support social legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, the public is relatively weak for a strong government side of the game, and its strength is not enough to radically change the already implemented the system, they are mostly in their actions affect the efficiency of the new system, although effects are sometimes not knowingly [10]. So the Government has access to enough feedback information, the new system and make necessary amendments or remedy. Government and the public in this process of repeated interaction, the efficiency of the new system to achieve a desired end, to achieve a balanced system. As the game process is a cost price, the performance of the new system implementation costs and friction costs (Fan, 1993), the government can not be on the new system and the public all the time to reach agreement, then gradual path is considered inevitable choice.
We note that the government system in the early market dominance of the game is very obvious. That, if there is no government system embedded in a strong, let the initial state of the system in the spontaneous evolution of society, China's market economy may not be established. However, this government-led institutional change model is facing in its mechanism, at least from three difficulties.
First, the government-led legal mandatory from its authority. Because of asymmetric information, authoritative information is relatively complete information about the relative lack of one party for the provision of information provided directly or by virtue of information superiority is recognized when the program or obedience. The information asymmetry depends on information search costs and differences in perception of information. From the information search costs, even the highest government and even prominent political leaders, it does not get what they want without cost to the authority, they must find and master the lot is not a popular message. We believe that the search for information, the government compared to other social existence, while having a clear advantage, but the need to search for the greater extent of information the greater the cost accordingly, and for those accessibility barriers to access to information channels, the Government and is not necessarily cheaper. We also note that the developed modern society, the media system in fact is part of the Government to bear the search costs. From the perception of information, the Government is not the existence of a transcendent reason, it is by "bounded rationality" of specific individuals (government officials) form, even if a whole can not exceed the "limited rationality" of the limitations of . As a result of information search costs are also not complete a "bounded rationality" category. And "bounded rationality" is also critical tool rationalism Hayek when one of the important evidence. Even with extraordinary charisma Charisma (Charisma), from an objective point of view, is not fully rational. Therefore, the public is no reason to believe that the Government provide complete solution must be optimal, and thus its authority have reason to be questioned. Thus, as the weakening of the authority, the legitimate government-led approach requires mandatory will inevitably decrease.
Second, the government-led changes in the system will face maximum output maximization and rent both difficult trade-offs and choices, and thus can not successfully unlock the "North paradox" (Zhang, 1993). We believe that the different systems of the main objective function (utility function) is different. Lin (1989) distinguish between the behavior of groups of primary spontaneous action is characterized by induced institutional change and the state, the conscious action of the government's mandatory system is characterized by changes at this point is obviously different. The new language can be described as classical: the former are entirely economic cost - benefit comparison as a starting point, and cost more than the maximum benefits of institutional change as the objective function; while the latter take into account both economic benefits (maximum output), also consider non-economic benefits (the maximum stability of the ruling, the largest government party interests maximizing monopoly rents), rent only when the output maximization and maximize overall benefits outweighed the costs, institutional change will occur. An empirical hypothesis is that when there is a highly centralized system of government and the political market imperfections, institutional change in order to grasp the core of the highest decision-making power of the leader's preferences and their interests change with the basic orientation of the system is consistent between the two is premise, while the core leadership's preferences and their interests are consolidated into a single political authority, to maximize their social support. This indicates that the rulers (government), utility maximization does not necessarily consistent with the maximization of social wealth, the goal of maximizing social wealth only to be pushed into its rulers to achieve their own goals until the marginal contribution equal to zero. Thus, when taking into account the competitive constraints faced by the Government and the transaction cost constraints and other cost factors, the kind of tolerance and ignore the low efficiency of the system of long-term sustainability of the government does not act, is that you can understand. Therefore, the government-led institutional change does not necessarily have long-term stability of the power source.
Third, a major government-led system of logic is based on understanding the evolution of the concept of linear features, namely, that the system will always be moving in a direction that is scheduled to evolve, even if there are fluctuations can also be a return to a linear path, This government-led system of supply for the next step possible to set a reasonable solution. However, from a biological point of view, Darwinian evolution is not progressive, stable selection process, and that a point-like non-linear equilibrium [11], this process can be expressed as: long-term stagnation of the process to be short-term static (the concept of geological time), the scene quickly broken by the formation of species. From an economic sense, once a particular system is established, it tends to self-sustaining [12]. System change is likely to be from the beginning of a large external shocks, such external shocks led to internal changes, which are cumulative, not continuous, gradual occurrence. At a critical turning point is selected, the selection rules of the basic features of the future is likely to generate constraints. From the initial equilibrium state of a variety of paths can be developed, not only viable path, and each time the turning point of the different options, will become the next choice of path dependence. Thus, the balance on the performance of the turning point for the various different options at the point-like non-linear characteristics. This way, the final formulation of linear features based on the ultimate goal of institutional change and path pattern arrangements, whether in the Government's progressive system of supply can be realized to be a problem.
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